For most firms, new product development is the engine for growth and profitability. A firm's new product success depends on its ability to manage the product development process in a way that employs scarce resources to achieve the goal of the firm as well as the specific project's objectives. Simple and measurable performance metrics have been proposed and applied to monitor and compensate the development teams. In this paper, we develop a modeling frame work to analyze the implications of setting managerial priorities for three commonly used new product performance metrics: (1) time-to-market, (2) product performance, and (3) total development cost. We model new product development as a "product performance production" process that requires scarce development resources. Setting a target for development teams for each of these performance metrics can constrain this performance production process and, thereby, affect the other performance metrics. We model the constrained process as a restricted case of a general process that does not have such constraints. We benchmark each constrained process against the optimal, unrestricted process with respect to the level of the resource intensity employed during the development process, the time-to-market, and the performance level of the new product at launch. We show that an overly ambitious time-to-market target leads to an upward bias in resource intensity usage and a downward bias in product performance (i.e., evolutionary product innovation). In addition, our results suggest that the target time-to-market approach may ignore the effect of cannibalization and, thus, can perform suboptimally if a significant degree of cannibalization in the existing product market is expected. Given a target product performance, we show that the coordination between marketing and R&D is easier because the resulting development resource intensity and time-to-market decisions becomes separable. However, an overly ambitious product performance target leads to an upward bias in the development resource intensity and a delayed product launch that misses the window of opportunity. Finally, we show that the target development cost approach can lead a downward bias in product performance and a premature product launch. The above analyses are performed for a monopolistic firm, and they are extended to passive and active competitive environment.
Introduction
For most¯rms, new product development is strategic because it can signi¯cantly a®ect their competitive position in the marketplace. A¯rm's new product success depends on its ability to employ scarce development resources to deliver high-performance products in a timely fashion.
E®ective management of the development process is di±cult due to its underlying complexity and the wide range of product performance criteria that it can in°uence. Three critical determinants of new product success that are directly a®ected by the management of timing and resources are: 1) time-to-market, 2) product performance, and 3) total development cost (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991) . These determinants of new product success, however, are interrelated and they may con°ict. Firms must consider potential tradeo®s among them. In Cohen, Eliashberg, and Ho (1996) , we introduce a model for studying the tradeo® between time-to-market and product performance. In this paper, we extend our previous work by allowing the level of development resource to vary with time and we develop a more general modeling framework that simultaneously considers the potential tradeo®s among all three determinants of new product success.
Indeed, Clark and Fujimoto (1991) empirically show that the three crucial determinants of new product success are time to market, product performance and development resources. (For a comprehensive review of other determinants of new product success, see Krishnan and Ulrich (2000) ). Previous research has considered only tradeo®s among a subset of these determinants. The economics R&D race literature assumes that the level of product performance is xed and examines the tradeo® between time-to-market and development resources (Kamien and Schwartz, 1982; Reinganum, 1989 ). This tradeo® exists because`crashing' a project costs money (Mans¯eld, 1988) . Time-to-market has also been an active area of research in marketing (see, for example, Mahajan, Muller, and Kerin, 1984; Wilson and Norton, 1989; Lilien and Yoon, 1990 ). This stream of research, however, often does not consider explicitly product development-related issues. For example, it is often assumed that the development cycle and investment are negligible. Our model aims to integrate these separate streams of literature.
We conceptualize new product development as a`product performance production' process that requires scarce development resources. Under a control-theoretic formulation, the level of development resource intensity and time-to-market are control variables that can signi¯cantly in°uence the product performance (the state variable), which in turn a®ects the market share and life-cycle pro¯ts.
In practice, many¯rms focus their attention primarily on one or two of the success determinants; few place equal emphasis on all three. In mature industries, for example, managers tend to focus primarily on the total development cost. Start-up¯rms with limited development budget may also want to focus on the total development cost. In high-tech industries, on the other hand, new product evaluation is more likely to be based on product performance and the time-to-market (e.g., computer equipment). Most¯rms set strategic targets for one of these metrics in order to control the new product management process. We use our model to study the implications of setting such managerial targets for each of the three determinants of success.
Setting a target on time-to-market has become a commonplace strategy because of the increasingly compressed product life-cycles in many industries. For example, in response to competitive pressures, Ingersoll-Rand recently set the time-to-market for all of its new products under development in its industrial tools division to be one year . We believe that the time factor must be put into context and that a short time-to-market must be weighed against its associated costs and potential impact on product performance. In industries where there are natural product introduction times (model year and season),¯rms may have less freedom to choose time-to-market. Examples include automobiles (beginning of the year), toys (Christmas season), and apparel (fashion season). In these cases, multiple targets can be set and studied using the proposed model.
A product performance target is often derived from a market share target. An ambitious product performance target can shape the development process in a way that leads to a revolutionary product introduction. For instance, Eastman Kodak sets product performance target to ensure market leadership by requiring their new product development teams to deliver a¯xed increment of superiority relative to the best product in the market (Ho, 1993) . The same approach can be also used by followers in a product market who wish to catch up with the leader. This approach may also be relevant in situations where¯rms race to overcome a certain technology barrier in order to develop a better new product (e.g., a new drug for a certain disease). It is certainly a chief metric in situations where product safety and liability are at stake (e.g., drugs, airplanes).
Setting a target for total development cost can be a result of an internal budget allocation process. In situations where development funds are limited, new product development teams may be directed to manage the development process in a manner that will not exceed the development cost budget. This approach is particularly common when the primary input to the development process is engineering labor input and the required engineering know-how is so specialized that it is impossible to hire additional people with the required know-how. In such cases, the development cost is constrained by the availability of the engineering personnel. It is also observed often in developing entertainment products such as movies.
The implications of setting speci¯c managerial priorities on these critical determinants are unclear. We study the e®ect of setting a target on each of the determinants by modeling the resulting development process (with the targets) as a restricted case of a more general unconstrained development process. We benchmark the constrained development process against the globally optimal (unrestricted) process with respect to the level of resource intensity employed during the development process, the time-to-market, and the performance of new product at launch. We employ pro¯tability as the common goal. Systematic deviations from the unconstrained process are highlighted so that¯rms who use the constrained processes can become aware of their potential impact.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model formulation and validate the underlying model assumptions. Section 3 provides conditions to characterize the optimal policy under unconstrained development process and the three constrained development processes. Section 4 discusses the results and outlines future research directions. Figure 1 illustrates the basic problem scenarios (see Cohen, Eliashberg, and Ho, 1996 Let the performance of the product at time t be A(t). The key relationship in our model framework is the speed of performance improvement. Speci¯cally, we de¯ne speed of increment for performance as follows:
Model Formulation
(2.1) dt where X(t) = level of development resource at time t, ® = resource productivity parameter, K = constant of proportionality for speed of performance improvement. It is proportional to the level of capital investment in the development technology.
There are diminishing returns to resource input, and thus 0 < ® < 1. Equation (2.1) is inspired by previous models assuming that research productivity is measured by rate of research output (e.g., number of patents per year) and is driven by resource intensity (see for example, Griliches, 1994 1. Setting a target may lead to higher awareness, peer-pressure, visibility, and motivation so that the members of the development team become more productive.
2. Selecting a target may lead to a higher`e®ective' resource intensity because members of the development teams work harder via over-time in order to meet the target.
Capturing these psychological bene¯ts would entail a good speci¯cation of how the resource productivity parameter changes over time (i.e., ® becomes ®(t)). We are not aware of an empirically well-grounded speci¯cation. Consequently, we leave this for further research.
Based on (2.1), the performance of the new product at time t is:
Assuming for a moment that the level of resource is¯xed (X(t) = X), equation (2.2) implies that the speed of performance improvement is invariant with time. That is, performance of the new product at its launching time, A(T ), increases linearly with time to market, T :
In order to investigate the empirical validity of (2.3), four project managers at a company site were asked to provide estimates for the expected time to market under a number of hypothetical product performance levels given a¯xed development resource level (for details on data collec-3 tion, see Ho, 1993) . Table 1 provides the managers' estimates. Data have been normalized to 1 A reviewer has pointed out that the e®ects of the metrics may actually be felt over time so one should consider multiple new product generations in order to fully capture their bene¯ts. Clearly, our model captures only the`steady-state' or`equilibrium' behavior. 2 In the analyses of the optimal policies (section 3), we prove formally that such a stationary policy of employing the level of resource is indeed optimal. 3 The questionnaire was constructed after several rounds of structured interviews with the project members.
Each project manager was asked to provide six estimates for the revised time to market given the same level of resources. To obtain more accurate estimates, project managers were probed about the reduced or additional development associated with the revised new product performance level. Our methodology is similar to that of Mans¯eld (1988 Figure 2 shows the results of regressing T against A(T ). The statistical signi¯cance of the P P parameter estimates is indicated by asterisk and the standard error is given in the parentheses.
Given the statistically signi¯cant parameter estimates for T and the high adjusted R-squared P values across all projects (from 0.83-0.98), it appears that product performance and time-tomarket are linearly related, at least in terms of managers' expectations, for the range or product performance of interests. In summary, the results of this anecdotal study provide some empirical support for performance improvement equation (2.3).
[ INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE ]
The¯rm's market share is a function of both its own product performance and the product performance of its competition. A reasonable market share function, frequently used in the marketing literature, is the attraction model (Bell, Keeney, and Little, 1975 ). The attraction model has been employed extensively in marketing and has received empirical support (See Cooper and Nakanishi, 1988 for a good review). The net revenue rate at time t for the¯rm that develops and introduces the new product is the product of the product category demand rate, the pro¯t margin, and and the¯rm's market share: The cumulative development costs of the new product at time t are:
The¯rm's cumulative pro¯t at time t is determined as follows,
where T R(t) and T C(t) are total revenues and costs at time t, respectively. The total revenue function is given by:
where R(:) is given in (2.4). The¯rm's decision set is 4 = fX(t); T g. We de¯ne the cumulative P pro¯t function, T ¦(±; T ), as the total pro¯t, by end of the window of opportunity, with decision ± 2 4. The¯rm's decision problem can be stated as
The combination of equations (2.1) through (2.7) generates an explicit representation of thē rm's cumulative pro¯t by the end of time horizon. This substitution yields:
The optimization problem [G1] can be reformulated as a an optimal control problem with state variable, A(t), and two control decisions, X(t) and T (Kamien and Schwartz, 1982) . In optimal P control terminology, the salvage term, ©(T ; A(T )) is de¯ned as follows:
The optimization problem [G1] becomes:
T ; A(T ); are free: (2.14) P P
Analyses of Optimal New Product Development Policies

The Unconstrained New Product Development Process
The¯rst proposition concerns the structure of the optimal level of resource intensity in an unconstrained development process (i.e., no restrictions on controls).
¤ ¤ Proposition 1 : The optimal level of resource intensity is time invariant, i.e, X (t) = X ; 8t.
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is based on two observations. First, the performance production process exhibits diminishing return to scale (i.e., the speed of performance improvement is strictly concave in the resource intensity). Thus, the average of the speeds of performance improvement at any two resource intensity levels is strictly smaller than the speed of performance improvement at the average of the two resource intensity levels. Second, the performance of the new product before launch has no implication on the life-cycle pro¯ts. That is, for a given level of product performance at launch, the evolution of the product performance during development does not matter as long as it begins with the same initial product performance.
These two observations explain the above structural (stationarity) result.
The same result can be generalized to a new product development process that has multiple stages as long as the performance improvement over stages are additive in nature. Here, it can be shown that the level of resource intensity at each of the development stages should be constant across time if it is diminishing return to scale but di®erent stages can have di®erent levels of resource intensity (see Ho, 1993) .
Having established formally that the optimal level of resource intensity is time invariant simplies the mathematical derivations greatly. Since resource intensity is stationary (i.e., X(t) = X),
Consequently, we can express the salvage 0 P P 0 ® term (©(T ; A(T )) in terms of X and T explicitly. Substituting A(T ) = A + K ¢ X ¢ T P P P P 0 P into equation (2.10), we have:
The second proposition characterizes the globally optimal policies. Proposition 2 : Under the unconstrained development process, the optimal level of resource ¤ ¤ intensity (X ) and time to market (T ) are jointly characterized by following optimality con-P ditions:
The above optimality conditions can be interpreted as follows. The¯rst optimality condition (the left-hand-side) is equal to a factor times the total development cost (X ¢ T ) (the last P term of the right-hand-side). This factor is the ratio of the total product performance in
rm's product performance (K ¢ (X ) ¢ T ) and its resource productivity parameter (®). This P optimality condition suggests that a compression of product life-cycle (i.e., a decrease in T ) will ¤ ¤ be accompanied by either a lower total development cost (i.e., a smaller X ¢ T ) or a lower P ¤ ® ¤ level of product performance improvement (i.e., a smaller K ¢ (X ) ¢ T ). For a¯xed level of P resource intensity, this means an early and more evolutionary product innovation.
The second optimality condition (3.3) relates the increase in the¯rm's net revenue rate after product launch (the left-hand-side) to the optimal resource intensity. It states that the former is a factor times the latter and the factor is the ratio of one minus the resource productivity parameter and the resource productivity parameter. Consequently, a¯rm that has an attractive existing product (high A ) will have a lower optimal resource intensity and a longer time to 0 market. In other words, an attractive existing product reduces the need for the¯rm to rush to market by employing a higher level of resource intensity.
Another way to interpret the two optimality conditions is to apply Dorfman 
The Target Time-to-Market (T ) Development Process P
The target time-to-market development process is equivalent to setting T equal to or less than P a particular value T , in problem G2. We consider the interesting case where the¯rm sets an P ¤ ambitious (accelerated) target for time-to-market (i.e., T < T ). P P Proposition 3 characterizes the optimal level of the development resource under the target T timing development process. It is denoted as X .
Proposition 3 : Under the target time-to-market development process, the optimal level T of development resource (X ) is characterized by the following optimality condition:
Unlike the unconstrained development process, the target timing development process has only one optimality condition. This optimality condition is similar to the optimality condition (3.2) ¤ except we have the term T instead of T . If the¯rm sets an ambitious target for time to
market (which is common in practice) so that T < T , it can be shown that X > X and
Thus we expect to see a systematic upward bias in the development resource P P intensity and a more evolutionary product performance under the target timing development process.
Comparing X with X , we note that X is not a function of R and A , whereas X is.
0
This suggests that the target time-to-market development process can be seriously°awed in situations when the¯rm has an existing product that has a high net revenue rate. That is, the target time-to-market development process fails to account for the cannibalistic e®ect of new product on the existing product.
D
It follows from the fact that the left-hand-side is decreasing in T and increasing in X and the right-hand-P D side is increasing in T and decreasing in X .
Indeed, investigated strategies of several new product launches by an industrial equipment¯rm. They observed that a short time to market target across all product launches can be problematic. This is so because the approach fails to account for di®erences in market characteristics especially the degree of success of the existing products. Consequently, the new product launches did not meet the¯rm's expectation of success.
Similarly, we can interpret the above optimality condition using the concept of elasticity. The ±© © elasticity of the net revenue with respect to resource intensity (X) is given by e = . At X ±X X TX ¢T ±© P optimality, = T and hence the elasticity is given by .
The Target Performance (A) Development Process
The target performance development process is equivalent to constraining the state variablê A(t) to be equal to or greater than a¯xed value, A, in problem G2. We consider the interesting 
In addition, total development cost, TC, as a function of the optimal time to market T P when the size of the development team is chosen optimally, is given as follows:
The structure of the optimal new product development policy is interesting. Given a product P erf P erf performance target A, the strategic decisions X and T become separable. In other P P erf P erf words, X
is not a function of T and vice versa. This suggests that once a strategic P target level of performance (A) is chosen, the timing and level of resource intensity decisions can be decentralized. In this respect, the target performance development process has an edge over other development processes because it requires less coordination between the marketing and R&D functions.
If A > A(T ), then X > X . Thus there is systematic upward bias in the development The target performance is frequently employed by companies where product liability is crucial to the company's reputation and survival (e.g., pharmaceutical, aircraft manufacturing). This extreme emphasis on performance involves numerous and rigorous product testing that lead to extended time to market. This often leads to less than optimal pro¯tability. The gap between actual and optimal pro¯tability represents the cost of insurance the¯rm bears to protect itself from a product liability suit.3
.4 The Target Development Cost (T C) Process
The approach is similar to the globally optimal procedure [G2] except that the term X(t)dt 0 is constrained to be equal to or less than T C. We consider the interesting case of a limited 
The optimality condition (3.8) relates the increase in the¯rm's net revenue rate (the left-handside) to that of the competitive's net revenue rate (the last term of the right-hand-side) after product launch. The former is a factor of the latter and the factor is the product of one minus resource productivity parameter and the ratio of maximal allowable increase in the¯rm's T ) ) and the total P P P product performance in the market after launch.
If limited budget is available (T C < X ¢ T ), then either X < X or T < T must be
true. If the former is true (X < X ), then A(T ) < A(T ) is true for most combinations of
parameters. However, if T < T , it is necessary that A(T ) < A(T ). Thus, the new product P P P P launch under the target development cost process tends to be premature with evolutionary product innovations.
Competitive Scenarios
A limitation of the analyses discussed so far is that we do not explicitly capture competition.
There are two ways to model competition under our modeling set up. The¯rst way is to capture an increasingly competitive environment by replacing A with A (t) where A (t) is increasing c c c in t. This is the case where the underlying¯rm is not explicitly competing with any particular rm in an increasing performance norm industry. The second way is to model the new product launch as a truly competitive game. Here we focus on the leading¯rm. We analyze how thē rm will have to take into account her action on a follower. Both scenarios are discussed next.
Passive Competitive Scenarios
We model a non-stationary environment where the industry performance norm gradually in- becomes for decision vector ± = fT ; Xg is:
The next proposition characterizes the globally optimal policies. Proposition 6 : Under the unconstrained development process and a non-stationary competitive environment such that A (t) = A +¯¢ t, and if¯is small enough, the optimal level of c c0 ¤ ¤ resource intensity (X ) and time to market (T ) are jointly characterized by following optimality P conditions:
Comparing the above optimality conditions with those given in equations (3.2)-(3.3) for the stationary competitive environment, we note the following similarities and di®erences:
1. The two sets of optimality conditions are similar except for an extra term associated with the increasingly competitive case in the¯rst optimality condition.
2. The optimality conditions for the increasingly competitive case help to clarify those for the stationary case. We note that the denominator in the LHS of the¯rst optimality condition is the total industry product performance at the end of the life cycle while the denominator in the LHS of the second optimality condition is the total industry product performance immediately right after the product launch. (Since they are identical in the stationary case, there is no way to make this distinction). increasing in X and T and the RHS side is in increasing in X and is independent of P ¤ T .) Thus we expect either a n early product launch accompanied by a lower investment P in resource intensity or simply a lower investment in resource intensity in an increasingly competitive environment.
Active Competitive Scenarios
Active competitive scenarios incorporating incumbents and new entrants (e.g., Eliashberg and Jeuland, 1986; Roy, et al, 1994 , Purohit, 1994 have typically employed the Stackelberg game set up (Stackelberg, 1934) . The competitive environment of interest is one in which new product development is undertaken by a leader L and a follower F . The leader believes that the follower will react to the leader's choice of time to market in a best response fashion. Knowing this, the leader then chooses a time to market that maximizes her pro¯t. The leader and the L F follower may have di®erent levels of initial product performance (A ; A ) and performance 0 0 L F _ _ improvement functions (A ; A ). Below, we assume that both¯rms have exogenously given performance improvement functions (i.e., a¯xed resource intensity X so that the decision set 4 = fT g) and that the leader has a higher speed of product performance than the follower P L F _ _ (i.e., A > A ). Figure 3 shows the total industry product performance over time under this competitive environment. Note that we now have two discrete jumps in the total industry performance (rather than one discrete jump in the total industry performance).
[ INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE ]
Leader Facing a Prepared Follower
The follower is taken to be`prepared' in the sense that it starts product development at exactly L F the same time as the leader. Let the time to market of¯rms L and F be T and T respectively.
P P
With the usual notations, leader and follower's life-cycle pro¯ts are:
The following lemma characterizes the prepared follower's optimal best response given a leader's L choice of T . P L Lemma 1 : The optimal time to market for the follower given a T is:
The following proposition characterizes the optimal time to market for the leader under certain conditions: 
L¤
It can be easily shown that T is decreasing in ½ so that the stronger the advantage of the P leader in product development capability, the sooner is her optimal time to market. Note that the advantage in product development capability can come from resource allocated to product development (i.e., X) or the level of productivity in resource utilization (i.e., ®).
Leader Facing a Surprised Follower
The follower is taken to be`surprised' in the sense that it starts product development only after F the leader has launched its new product. Let T be the follower's time to market measured P L from T . The leader and follower's life-cycle pro¯ts are:
The following lemma characterizes the prepared follower's optimal best response given a leader's L choice of T . P L Lemma 2 : The optimal time to market for the follower given a T is:
The following proposition characterizes the optimal time to market for the leader under certain conditions:
If A = A = 0 and R À maxfX ; X g, then the optimal Proof: See Appendix.
L¤
Again, it can be easily shown that T is decreasing in ½ so that the stronger the advantage of P the leader, the smaller is her optimal to market.
It is interesting to compare the optimal launching times under both scenarios. The following proposition establishes the value of \surprising" the follower: surprised follower always launches a product with higher level of performance and at a later time than the one that faces a prepared follower.
Intuitively, the leader facing a prepared follower feels a greater pressure to launch the new product than the one who manages to surprise the competitor.
Discussion
We have developed a model for examining the interplay of three determinants of new product success: 1) time to market, 2) product performance, and 3) development cost. We have applied the model to analyze the merits and shortcomings of setting a target on each of the three new product performance metrics commonly used in industry: (1) the time-to-market target, (2) the product performance target, (3) the development cost target.
Our analytical results show that:
² An overly ambitious time-to-market target leads to an upward bias in resource intensity usage and a downward bias in product performance (i.e., evolutionary product innovation.) In addition, the optimal resource intensity is not a®ected by R ; A . This ² Under the target development cost approach, allocating a limited budget to a new product development project can lead to a downward bias in product performance and a premature product launch (i.e., an evolutionary product introduction).
² A¯rm facing a gradually increasing performance norm in her industry will lower the investment in resource intensity.
² A leader facing a prepared follower feels a greater time pressure to launch the new product than the one who manages to surprise the competitor.
Extensions of the work described in this paper could include explicit incorporation of risk (both for product development and in the market). In addition, the policy implications of our results suggest a number of testable hypotheses, which can be studied using cross-sectional procedures.
Finally, the modeling approach, presented here, can be implemented through a decision support system in a speci¯c company context (see Cohen, Eliashberg and Ho, 1997) . Application of such a system would introduce formalism and rigor to a complex and critical management process.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Suppressing the time argument, the Hamiltonian of G2 is:
The necessary conditions for optimality are (Kamien and Schwartz,1992) :
3), we have¸= ¡H . Since H is not a function of A, we have¸= 0. Di®erentiating A A A (6.1) with respect to X, we obtain:
Setting (6.6) to zero and solving for X , we obtain:
A A
Proof of Proposition 2
From (6.1), we have the maximized Hamiltonian:
Since X and¸are time invariant, H is also time invariant. Since H is independent of A ¤ for given¸, the necessary optimality conditions (6.2) -(6.5) are also su±cient (Kamien and Schwartz, 1992, pp. 221-226) .
From (6.5), we obtain:
Since¸is time invariant, it is completely determined from 0 to T by the RHS of equation P (6.9). Substituting equation (6.9) into (6.7), we obtain the desired optimality condition (3.2).
From (6.4), we have:
H is completely characterized from 0 to T by RHS of equation (6.10) because it is time P invariant. Equating (6.8) and (6.10) we obtain:
Simplifying terms, we obtain the desired optimality condition (3.3).
Q. E. D.
Proof of Proposition 3
The necessary and su±cient optimality conditions are identical to problem [G2] except that condition (6.4) is no longer valid. The expression for optimal level of resource intensity (6.7)
T remains the same. The revised auxiliary variable (¸) is:
The optimal level of resource intensity can be solved by substituting¸into equation (6.7). Q.
E. D.
Proof of Proposition 4
The necessary and su±cient optimality conditions are identical to problem [G2] except that condition (6.5) is no longer valid. The expression for optimal level of resource intensity (6.7) P erf remains the same except that the auxiliary variable (¸) is now di®erent. Instead of (6.5), we have the following transversality condition:
The above transversality condition requires that the total improvement in the level of perfor-P erf P erf mance from 0 to T is A ¡ A . The revised auxiliary variable¸, is found to be:
Equations (6.7) and (6.11) become:
From equation (6.16), we have¸= . Substituting this into equation (6.17) and K¢® simplifying, we obtain:^A
he desired expression for T can be found by substituting X into K ¢ (X ) ¢ T = A ¡ A .
P P
This yields:
A+AcĜ iven that the¯rm pursues a¯xed performance target A and chooses the optimal size of the 
To prove that TC is a decreasing convex function of T , we take the¯rst and second derivatives P of TC with respect to T . 
that X (t) = X at optimal). Substitute A(T ) = K ¢ (T C) ¢ (T ) into ©(T ; A(T )),
the objective is a function of T only. Di®erentiating ©(T ; A(T )) with respect to T , we P P P P have:
Setting the above expression to zero and simplifying we obtain the desired¯rst-order condition.
Proof of Proposition 6
Di®erentiating T ¦ with respect to T and X yields the following¯rst-order conditions:
Simplifying equation (6.26), we have:
Substituting the above equation into equation (6.25), we have:
Simplifying, we obtain the desired optimality condition (4.3). From equation (6.27), we have:
Simplifying the above equation, we have:
If¯is small enough such that ¿ 1, we can approximate ln(1 +
we obtain the desired optimality condition (4.2).
Proof of Lemma 1 L
The optimal time to market for the follower for a given T can be determined as in Proposition P L L L _ 1 with A = A + A ¢ T . Thus we have the following optimality condition:
The proposition follows directly from solving the above expression.
Proof of Proposition 7
L F F L If A = A = 0 and R À maxfX ; X g, then equation (4.6) becomes: The optimal time to market for the follower for a given T can be determined as in Proposition P L L L L _ 1 with A = A + A ¢ T and has the time window of (T ¡ T ). Thus we have the following c 0 P P optimality condition:
The proposition follows directly from solving the above expression. 
Proof of
